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NOTE 
 
Sherman’s Wrath: Sports Data’s Impending Collision with Antitrust Law 
 




In 2018, the Supreme Court turned the world of sports betting on its head 
with its ruling in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.1 In Murphy, the 
Court struck down the Federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA) as unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine, effectively 
opening the door for states to legalize sports gambling as they deemed fit.2 Since the 
Court’s decision, twenty states and the District of Columbia have passed sports 
betting legislation, with several more states currently debating measures.3 The 
post-Murphy era has turned out to be very lucrative for these entrepreneurial 
states, with gambling revenues exceeding $1.3 billion and state taxes from those 
proceeds exceeding $155 million.4 Implicit in this new industry (and the basis for 
the following analysis) is a complex network of companies looking to get data from 
sportsbooks as quickly and as accurately as possible.5 
Given the amount of sporting events they hold every season, both the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) and Major League Baseball (MLB) produce 
large amounts of event data that are used by gambling outlets to provide timely and 
accurate betting odds.6 While a sportsbook might be able to manually input 
statistics on a slower night (during Monday Night Football), that process is neither 
logistically nor budgetarily realistic for busy Sunday afternoons, when as many as 
fifteen games can be simultaneously occurring in the MLB alone.7 To solve this 
problem, sportsbooks have turned to third-party data suppliers, like industry leader 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2021. B.S. Sport Marketing and Management, 
Indiana University, 2018. I am grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Shana Wallace, Michael 
Mattioli, and Marc Edelman. I would also like to thank the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality 
Editorial Board for their unwavering support and assistance throughout the editing process. All errors and 
omissions are my own. 
1  138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
2  See id. at 1478. 
3  See Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP., 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2020, 10:28PM). 
4  US Sports Betting Revenue and Handle, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-
betting/revenue/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2020, 6:16 PM). 
5  A “sportsbook” is an “establishment that takes bets on sporting events and pays out winnings.” Sportsbook, 
LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sportsbook (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). 
6  See Scott Polacek, NBA to Give Sportsbooks Real-Time Data for In-Game Betting Odds, BLEACHER REP. 
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2808217-nba-to-give-sportsbooks-real-time-data-for-in-
game-betting-odds. 
7  See, e.g., Jacob Janower, MLB Opening Day 2019: Schedule for All 30 Teams, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/mlb/news/mlb-opening-day-2019-schedule-for-all-30-
teams/16vg11pnw02ql1pt42fofkth3y. 
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Sportradar, to access the MLB’s data feed in real time to populate sports gambling 
sites.8 
As the interest in legal sports betting nationwide has increased, so too has 
the need for sportsbooks to provide the most accurate betting lines. To best explain 
this phenomenon, take the example of the 2019 Home Run Derby champion and 
New York Mets first baseman Pete Alonso.9 Alonso is widely regarded as one of the 
best hitters in baseball and is a constant threat to pitchers every time he steps up to 
the plate.10 As such, it follows that a sportsbook would want to drive in additional 
revenue by writing a prop bet on whether Alonso would hit a home run in his next 
at bat.11 To set the line, or the odds in which the occurrence will take place, the 
sportsbook could conceivably use a simple analysis of Alonso’s past performance as 
a hitter, perhaps even fine-tuned to the pitcher he is currently facing.12 As 
technology advances, however, so does the information betters can glean about a 
certain player. Thus, it is conceivable that a sportsbook, and even a sports data 
supplier, has more incentive to access the most nuanced and detailed data 
available. 
In 2016, Blast Motion entered into an exclusive agreement with the MLB to 
be the league’s official “bat sensor technology” supplier.13 Per Blast Motion’s press 
release regarding the agreement, its product consists of a “water proof sensor and 
bat attachment [that] slips over the knob of any baseball or softball bat and ha[s] 
been designed to capture highly accurate swing metrics and analyze performance.”14 
Then, collected data would be transmitted to the team in hopes of providing a more 
useful insight into someone like Alonso’s hitting tendencies, thus enabling teams to 
better tailor practice sessions.15 So, just as easily as this technology can be used for 
team improvement, it could also be used by sportsbooks to hone in on players’ swing 
metrics, allowing for more accurate prop bets and better sportsbook odds in the long 
 
8  See Robert Mann, Understanding the NBA’s Sports Betting Data Deals with Sportradar, Genius Sports, 
SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/nba-sports-betting-sportradar-genius-sports-
federal/. 
9  See Mark Feinsand, Polar Bear Pete! Alonso Wins Home Run Derby, MLB.COM (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/pete-alonso-wins-2019-home-run-derby. 
10  See id. 
11  A prop bet, or proposition bet, is one of the fastest growing betting phenomena in sports betting. Similar to 
a futures bet, a prop bet can cover any single in-game occurrence, ranging from which player would score 
the first run to which teams win the coin toss at the Super Bowl. What are Sports Prop Bets?, LINES (Oct. 
22, 2019), https://www.thelines.com/betting/prop-bets/. 
12  This stat is commonly referred to as “batting average against,” and can be calculated by “Hits Allowed” 
divided by (“Batters Faced” minus “Walks” minus “Hit Batsmen” minus “Sacrifice Hits” minus “Sacrifice 
Flies” minus “Catcher's Interference”). While this may seem like an intensive analysis, it is one of the more 
commonly used measurements of a hitter’s success. What Is a Batting Average (AVG)?, MLB.COM, 
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/standard-stats/batting-average (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
13  I will be using the Mets as an example in this Note, but many MLB teams are entering into similar 
agreements. Press Release, Blast Motion, Blast Baseball Named the Official Bat Sensor Technology of 
Major League Baseball® (June 30, 2016), https://blastmotion.com/about/press/blast-baseball-named-official-
bat-sensor-technology-major-league-baseball/.  
14  Id. 
15  See id. (discussing the viability of Blast Motion technology to “provide a 360-degree game improvement 
solution, optimized for both major and minor league practice sessions and equipment management”). 
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run. 
Another example follows in the case of baseball pitchers, such as New York 
Mets National League Cy Young Award winner Jacob deGrom.16 As a dominant 
pitcher, deGrom has the ability to change the dynamic of any game and, as 
previously mentioned, the betting lines.17 In August 2018, deGrom and the Mets 
faced off against fellow all-star pitcher Cole Hamels and the Chicago Cubs.18 The 
game went into the tenth inning, at which time MLB suspended play due to 
inclement weather.19 When play picked up the next day, a Las Vegas sportsbook 
noticed the current odds did not account for deGrom’s departure in favor of 
lackluster Mets relief pitcher Paul Sewald, who sported an abysmal 5.00 Earned 
Run Average.20 It is likely that many bets were placed on the Cubs at much better 
odds than there would have been had the pitching change been accounted for, and 
sportsbooks likely lost thousands of dollars as a result.21 
Technology startups, such as Motus, have begun to gather this invaluable 
data.22 The MLB recently entered into an agreement to allow teams to monitor their 
pitcher’s performance using the MotusTHROW training platform.23 The 
MotusTHROW sensor sits below the pitcher’s Ulnar Collateral Ligament, 
measuring “peak valgus torque on the arm.”24 The sensor not only has the ability to 
measure pitching velocity but can also measure pitcher fatigue, telling teams when 
it is time to make a switch on the mound. 25 Access to this information is valuable 
for players, teams, and sportsbooks alike. 
It is exactly this kind of advanced data that gives rise to the markets 
analyzed in this Note. Both the MLB and the NBA have entered into non-exclusive 
partnerships with previously mentioned “official game data suppliers.”26 While the 
NBA’s official non-exclusive agreements are with the companies Sportradar and 
Genius Sports,27 the MLB signed a non-exclusive deal with only Sportradar (with 
 
16  See Anthony DiComo, deGrom Runaway NL Cy Young Award Winner, MLB.COM (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/jacob-degrom-wins-nl-cy-young-award-c300738088 (awarding deGrom for being 
the best pitcher in his league). 
17  See id. 
18  Matt Rybaltowski, Here’s How Much ‘Official’ League Data Actually Costs, SPORTS HANDLE (Mar. 12, 2019) 
https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-official-data-cost/. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  motusTHROW, MOTUS, https://www.motusglobal.com/motusbaseball (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
23  Darren Rovell, MLB Approves Device to Measure Biometrics of Players, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/18835843/mlb-approves-field-biometric-monitoring-device. 
24  motusTHROW, supra note 22. 
25  Id. 
26  See Rybaltowski, supra note 18.  
27  Press Release, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA Announces First Betting-Data Partnerships in U.S. with 
Sportradar, Genius Sports (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nba.com/article/2018/11/28/nba-sportradar-genius-
sports-partnership-official-release. 
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the option of adding “additional authorized distributors”).28 Sportradar entered into 
an agreement to have the “exclusive distribution rights for official MLB real-time 
game statistics, as collected at every ballpark via the league’s proprietary 
technology and stat operators, to both media companies and regulated sports 
betting operators.”29  
The following analysis will show how the MLB and the NBA’s agreements 
run afoul of antitrust law. Part I of this analysis will discuss the relevant markets, 
including the preexisting sports data supply market and the market shift post-
Murphy. Part II will explore the applicable areas of intellectual property to the 
ownership of sports data. Part III will analyze the antitrust implications of the non-
exclusive agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part IV will then detail 




Most antitrust litigation hinges on the precise definition of the relevant 
market.30 A proper market definition identifies firms that compete against each 
other in order to home in on the relevant anticompetitive conduct.31 To determine 
whether a joint venture truly produces tangible anticompetitive effects among 
firms, it must first be determined with whom they are actually in competition. 
Market definition analyses, while often labor-intensive and factually specific, are 
“an indispensable ingredient of every claim under the full rule of reason” analysis 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.32 
Traditionally, markets have been defined in relation to buyer preferences.33 
This doctrinal test was first defined by the Supreme Court in the seminal 
Cellophane decision, which described a market as one that consists of goods 
“reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.”34 Courts 
typically analyze various factors depending on the specificities of the product, 
including the interchangeability of goods and the cross-elasticity of demand of the 
product.35 At trial, evidence of market definition can vary, but the evidence involves 
 
28  Press Release, Sportradar, Major League Baseball and Sportradar Announce Official Exclusive Global 
Partnership (Feb. 27, 2019), https://sportradar.us/2019/02/major-league-baseball-and-sportradar-announce-
official-exclusive-global-partnership/.  
29  Id. (emphasis added). 
30  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992). 
31  Markets are, contrary to popular belief, defined by the products and not the participants. See, e.g., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1.12, 1.22 (1992, revised 2010).  
32  Brandon Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports’ League-Wide Licensing and 
Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 35 (1999).  
33  See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). Buyer 
substitution was deemed the preferential analysis by governmental agencies in the 1982 Merger 
Guidelines. See Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 194 
(1992). 
34  Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 395. 
35  Id. at 394–95. 
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an “assessment of the magnitude of the economic force of buyer substitution.”36 
Before and even during litigation, business executives will often try to introduce 
internal evidence of whom they deem to be their competitors, but courts are 
typically wary of this and only introduce evidence gathered from the normal course 
of business.37 
To determine the relevant market in an analysis of sports data markets, 
priority must be given to understanding the various forms of sports data. The 
market for sports data collected during the sporting event itself has existed for a 
long time.38 Event data encompasses statistics representing all facets of a sporting 
event, including: the weather, field conditions, team achievements, and individual 
achievements such as home runs, rebounds, and touchdowns thrown.39  Rapid 
technological development has led to another subset of metrics—performance data 
that cannot be seen by the naked eye.40 The NBA, and subsequently NBA sports 
bettors, have especially embraced the benefits of this new performance data, with 
many players using wearables41 during games, and some even wearing these 
devices during sleep to measure fatigue levels in order to avoid injury.42 
Technology-intensive statistical analysis has led to a seismic shift in team 
philosophies and has impacted the way general managers scout talent.43  
Given the need for accurate and timely sports data, the question becomes: 
who will collect it? There are three main accumulators of sports data: governing 
associations, individual teams, and private companies.44 The collection of sports 
data by governing associations is a relatively new phenomenon.45 Though more 
common internationally, a large number of professional soccer leagues have begun 
to use private databases to engage with data from their competitions.46 For 
example, the German soccer league, the Bundesliga, recently began to invest in a 
 
36  Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 138 (2007). 
37  Amanda J. Parkison Hassid, Note, An Oracle Without Foresight? Plaintiffs' Arduous Burdens Under U.S. v. 
Oracle, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 906 (2007) (“[T]he courts and the Guidelines look to company documents to 
support assertions about competition in the marketplace. The Guidelines explicitly suggest that agencies 
should look to normal course of business documents from industry participants . . . .” (internal quotation 
omitted)).  
38  See Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners Over Information and 
Statistics Generated About Their Sports Events, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 58, 60 (2015). 
39  Event data attributable to actions taken during the event can vary widely but is all considered raw data. Id. 
at 58–59. 
40  Dan Kopf, Data Analytics Have Made the NBA Unrecognizable, QUARTZ (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://qz.com/1104922/data-analytics-have-revolutionized-the-nba/. 
41  “Wearables” are wearable performance monitors that allow coaches and training staff to monitor and record 
various metrics, such as temperature and heart rate. See Shourjya Sanyal, How Are Wearables Changing 
Athlete Performance Monitoring?, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2018, 8:56 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shourjyasanyal/2018/11/30/how-are-wearables-changing-athlete-performance-
monitoring/?sh=1f389f17ae09. 
42  Kopf, supra note 40. 
43  See id. 
44  Frodl, supra note 38, at 59–60. 
45  Id. at 62. 
46  Id. 
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private database for collection and distribution of sports data, while using third-
party companies to manage the licensing scheme of the data.47 
Individual teams also collect data for their own analysis.48 While baseball 
was the first sport to have teams collect and use player performance data 
domestically, the most salient example exists in the NBA’s Houston Rockets.49 
Daryl Morey, Rockets general manager and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
graduate, spearheaded the team’s effort to better understand player performance 
data.50 Morey and the Rockets noticed a fundamental problem in NBA game 
plans—most teams take a staggeringly low number of three-pointers.51 Morey then 
adjusted the team’s game plan, opting to create more plays that included 
opportunities to take as many three pointers as possible from the corner, 
statistically proven as basketball’s most efficient shot.52  
The most important and largest players in the sports data industry are 
private sports data supply organizations.53 Sports Team Analysis and Tracking 
Systems (STATS) is a Chicago-based company, specializing in sports data, 
technology, and content.54 Founder John Dewan (another Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology graduate) transformed STATS from a small regional data supplier to 
the primary sports data provider of the digital age through a series of competitor 
acquisitions.55 As of 2014, STATS had employed over 350 employees and covered 
sporting events around the world.56 Current clients include the NBA, MLB, 
National Hockey League (NHL), and Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA).57 In 2014, STATS acquired Bloomberg Sports’s data collection 
arm and gained a large majority of the sports data market.58 These sports data 
suppliers are indispensable to the success of betting platforms across the world, 
given the inevitable rise in demand for advanced analytical data by sportsbooks. 
Given that background of the current state of sports data, it is prudent to 
 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Zach Sarnoff, Moreyball: The Houston Rockets and Analytics, HARV. BUS. SCH.: DIGITAL INNOVATION & 
TRANSFORMATION (Apr. 5, 2018), https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-digit/submission/moreyball-the-houston-
rockets-and-analytics/. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  See Alyssa Schroer, From Fantasy Football Predictions to Baseball’s Statcast, Big Data in Sports Is a Real 
Game Changer,  BUILT IN (Dec. 5, 2018), https://builtin.com/big-data/big-data-companies-sports. 
54  Shayna Goldman, The Evolution of STATS LLC and Its Place in the Sports Technology Landscape, 
SPORTTECHIE (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.sporttechie.com/the-evolution-of-stats-llc-and-its-place-in-the-
sports-technology-landscape/. 
55  Id.  
56  Jonathan El Kordi-Hubbard, With Clients Like the NBA and Google, STATS is the Coolest Data Company 
You've Never Heard of, BUILT IN CHI. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.builtinchicago.org/2014/02/25/clients-nba-
and-google-stats-coolest-data-company-youve-never-heard. 
57  Id. 
58  Eric Fisher, Stats LLC Buys Bloomberg Sports in First Major Move Under Vista Equity Partners Control, 
SPORTS BUS. J. DAILY (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2014/09/04/Finance/Stats.aspx.  
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discuss how courts have previously analyzed market power in sports antitrust 
litigation. In 1984, the Supreme Court analyzed the antitrust liability of college 
athletics in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, focusing on the 
limitations of the NCAA’s broadcasting agreements for college football games.59 The 
Court determined that an agreement centralizing the broadcasting rights of 
member schools that limited the number of times certain schools could be televised 
constituted a restraint of trade.60 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected 
the NCAA’s argument that it lacked the necessary market power to be liable under 
antitrust laws.61 The Court found the NCAA to be a unique entity, and reasoned 
that a lack of market power does not result in a license to freely restrain 
competition.62 The issue ultimately was that advertisers can conceivably pay a 
premium price to reach viewers, and a joint agreement fully inhibits any 
competition in that market.63 
The Seventh Circuit revisited the market for sport broadcasting agreements 
in a professional sports context in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. 
National Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II).64 In Bulls II, the agreement at issue was very 
similar to that in Board of Regents, wherein the NBA limited the number of Chicago 
Bulls games that could be broadcast on WGN, a large television network in the 
metro Chicago area.65 The court concluded that the NBA had a wider product 
market for its games than the NCAA, and, thus, the NBA likely competed for 
viewership with other forms of entertainment, as opposed to just sports.  
The Second Circuit took up a non-broadcast-related antitrust challenge to the 
MLB’s licensing scheme in Major League Baseball Properties v. Salvino, Inc.66 In 
Salvino, the issue was whether the MLB could force Salvino, a California 
corporation that produces, sells, and distributes sports collectables, to obtain a 
license to sell its line of stuffed animals adorned with MLB team logos.67 The 
Second Circuit focused closely on how narrow the market should be defined, 
ultimately ruling in favor of MLB, in large part because Salvino’s expert could not 
support the contention of an extremely narrow market.68 
These cases underscore two key points about analyses of sports markets. 
First, potential challengers to impermissible joint ventures, such as those of the 
NBA and MLB outlined in this Note, should seek to define the market as narrowly 
as possible. As seen in Salvino, this is a make-or-break point in litigation. If a court 
determines that the market in question is only each individual team’s advanced 
 
59  468 U.S. 85, 88, 92–95 (1984). 
60  Id. at 98, 113. 
61  Id.  
62  Id. at 88, 109, 111–12. 
63  Id. at 112. 
64  95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  
65  Id. at 595. 
66  542 F.3d 290, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2008). 
67  See id.  
68  Salvino argued that the relevant market should be limited to just MLB licensed products. Id. at 294, 300–
01, 329. The court disagreed. Id. at 294, 329–30. 
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game data, rather than all game data, complainants could more easily prevail. 
Second, these cases demonstrate the importance of specifying the exact 
anticompetitive market in question. While the market for sports data has been 
around a long time,69 this rise of advanced data that can prove to be immensely 
valuable, not only for teams but also other entities that seek to profit off of sports 
data, such as betting houses. Even so, the specific product market should not deal 
with consumers (both bettors and betting facilitators) but instead the entities that 
are selling the data on the frontend, the teams. Being overly precise about this 
specificity will pay dividends in an eventual joint-venture analysis.70 
As such, a sports data supply company challenging the NBA or MLB’s 
agreements should seek to (1) define the product market as narrowly as possible 
and (2) learn from the mistakes of the complainant in Salvino by properly backing 
up the market definition with empirical data. 
 
II. OWNERSHIP OF SPORTS DATA 
 
The MLB and NBA’s agreements with Sportradar violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act as impermissible joint ventures regarding the sale of advanced 
team data. For MLB and NBA teams to enter a joint venture regarding data 
supply, they must first own the advanced data from their games. As previously 
mentioned, there is a burgeoning market for advanced data resulting from the 
rise of in-game betting.71 Growth of technological capabilities has expanded the 
available wagers one can make on games.72 Seasoned “trading veteran[s]” are 
now being commissioned to assist with real-time odds making as play progresses 
in a sporting event.73 Because of the short-lived demand of in-game statistics, 
sportsbooks are incentived to have all the data possible at their disposal to write 
the most accurate betting lines possible.74 
Specifically regarding baseball games, the Western District of 
Pennsylvania held in Pittsburgh Athletic v. KQV Board Co. that “it is perfectly 
clear that the exclusive right to broadcast play-by-play descriptions of the games 
played by [a professional sports team] at their home field rests in [that team].”75 
While limited in precedential value because of its originating venue and its age, 
Pittsburgh Athletic has been cited by the Supreme Court to propose that the 
First Amendment does not give a broadcasting company the right to film and 
broadcast a baseball game “where the promoters or the participants had other 
 
69  See supra text accompanying notes 51–55.  
70  See infra Part III. 
71  See Brett Smiley, The Rise and Excitement of In-Play Betting, Explained by Expert, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 
13, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/in-play-sports-betting-expert-analysis/. 
72  Id. 
73  See id. (noting the example of famed trader Craig Mucklow). 
74  See id. 
75  24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1938). 
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plans for publicizing the event.”76 Along these lines, the Seventh Circuit has held 
that player performance data collected during baseball games was sufficiently 
creative to confer copyright protection.77 
However, some statistics that are products of advanced technology owned 
by MLB and NBA teams are copyrightable. While a team could not copyright the 
weather at the time of first pitch or a “naked eye statistic” such as the number of 
rebounds a player had, most advanced statistics previously discussed go far 
beyond that data, providing a window into the game that was not available even 
a decade ago.78 In Kregos v. Associated Press, the Second Circuit discussed the 
copyright availability of baseball data and stated that normal data off of a 
scoresheet would not convey copyright protection.79 To confer copyright 
protection, however, all that was needed was a simple display of “cognizable 
creativity.”80 Creativity could even take the simple form of a specific author’s use 
of a heading to display information in a manner that is “out of the ordinary.”81 
Following this logic, advanced data produced by MLB and NBA teams is 
sufficiently creative to confer copyright protection. Gone are the days of writing 
down simple statistics by hand to measure a player’s basic performance. Instead, 
teams are using proprietary technology, such as wearable sleeves and advanced 
bat sensors, to fully measure a player’s performance and optimize the team’s 
practice regimen.82 This data is beyond anything a fan or scout can see with 
their naked eye and is the result of many years and millions of dollars of creative 
research and development.83 Also, this data is not used in its raw form, but 
meticulously and creatively arranged to produce reliable metrics that will give 
teams a competitive advantage.84 Gathered and processed by sophisticated data 
research analysts, such data is, by every definition under Kregos, copyrightable 
by teams as creative information.85 
Trade secrecy laws also can confer intellectual property protections to 
advanced data. Legal claims under the doctrine of trade secrecy would likely be 
 
76  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). 
77  Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Only a 
modicum of creativity is required for a work to be copyrightable.”) 
78  For an example of a widely used advanced baseball statistic, see Steve Slowinski, wOBA, FANGRAPHS (Feb. 
15, 2010), https://library.fangraphs.com/offense/woba/. 
79  937 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1991). 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  See supra text accompanying note 11. 
83  As an example, teams have devoted entire salaried positions to this type of research. See Meg Rowley, Job 
Posting: Nationals Baseball Research & Development Analyst and Data Engineer, FANGRAPHS (Oct. 18, 
2019), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/instagraphs/job-posting-nationals-baseball-research-development-
analyst-and-data-engineer/. 
84  See Sam Miller, What Happens When Baseball-Stats Nerds Run a Pro Team?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/opinion/sunday/what-happens-when-baseball-stats-nerds-run-a-pro-
team.html (discussing how a minor league baseball team improved with the addition of advanced statistics). 
85  See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 708. 
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adjudicated under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).86 The UTSA has gained 
widespread acceptance, as it has been adopted in forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia.87 Under the UTSA, a trade secret is defined as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.88 
Under these requirements, advanced data created by teams using proprietary 
technology could qualify for trade secret protection. A trade secret must only be 
“sufficient to confer an actual potential economic advantage.”89 Proprietary 
technology used by teams serves that exact purpose. Teams are engaged in an arms 
race to give themselves the best competitive advantage they can.90 It is only natural 
that teams seek to keep this advantage private, both in the data and in the ways 
and means of obtaining that data.91 
An exemplary case exists in Daktronics, Inc. v. McAfee.92 In Daktronics, 
longtime coach David Baker pitched the sports data company Daktronics on a new 
technology that could read and display the type and speed of a pitch to spectators in 
real time.93 After many meetings, Daktronics helped Baker build a prototype of the 
product, and the pair began to pitch the idea to MLB teams.94 Shortly thereafter, 
Daktronics began manufacturing its own version of the radar product, using 
sturdier and more permanent hardware, including a display that showed 
information other than just the pitch speed and type—a design better suited for an 
MLB stadium.95 The South Dakota Supreme Court rejected McAfee’s claim that the 
“concept of displaying speed and type of pitch thrown for the public to view at a 
ballpark” constituted an identifiable trade secret claim.96 Specifically, the court 
focused on the absence of novelty of the information gathered by Baker’s machine, 
reasoning that the information on pitch speed and type was already available at 
multiple ballparks, and this technology was simply an alternative means to a 
 
86  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005). 
87  Matthew J. Frankel, Secret Sabermetrics: Trade Secret Protection in the Baseball Analytics Field, 5 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. 240, 244 (2012).  
88  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra note 86. 
89  Frankel, supra note 87, at 253. 
90  Id. at 264–65. 
91  See id. at 267–68. 
92  1999 SD 113, 599 N.W.2d 358. 
93  Id. ¶ 2, 599 N.W.2d at 360. Today, this technology is colloquially referred to as a radar gun. 
94  Id. ¶ 4, 599 N.W.2d at 360. 
95  Id. ¶ 6 n.*, 599 N.W.2d at 360. 
96  Id. ¶¶ 14–21, 599 N.W.2d at 361–63. 
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common end.97  
The case of advanced data is vastly different. The UTSA extends protection to 
“methods” and “techniques” that are secretive and valuable.98 This protection could 
very well apply to advanced data. Unlike the publicly available data discussed in 
Daktronics, advanced data produced is not available to the naked eye and is the 
product of sophisticated and expensive equipment procured by a team and its 
partners.99 The process of procuring advanced data, from designing and 
manufacturing the equipment, to turning the raw output into sophisticated metrics, 
is a process that involves an enormous team investment.100 Not only can the inner 
workings of the technology be protected, so too can the usable data that comes from 
that technology.  
International jurisdictions have also grappled with the issues of sports data 
protection. In 2004, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided two 
cases related to the protection of fixture lists, commonly known in the United States 
as team scheduling. The first case, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Organismos 
Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairon AE, involved an alleged unauthorized use of 
soccer schedules by betting companies in various European Union countries.101 In 
Fixtures Marketing, the CJEU denied property protection to fixture lists.102 The 
court focused on the allocation of monetary resources, reasoning that one of 
European soccer’s flagship league, the English Premier League, had not expended 
additional resources, and a lack of a separate investment indicated a lack of 
importance of the fixtures beyond its mere requirement for competition.103 The 
CJEU later affirmed this reasoning in British Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William 
Hill Organization Ltd., finding that scheduling of horse races was a fundamental 
task of governance of the sport, and no separate investment was required to create 
the lists beyond the board’s day-to-day tasks.104 Thus, courts make special note of 
the time and personnel investment that goes into scheduling when determining 
whether various kinds of sports data merits intellectual property protection. 
 
III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
 
American antitrust laws are mainly concerned with two types of business 
conduct: that of unilateral firms and that of concerted action between 
competitors.105 While unilateral conduct is subject to a rigorous Section 2 analysis, 
 
97  Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 599 N.W.2d at 362. 
98  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra note 86. 
99  See supra notes 11–13 discussion and accompanying text. 
100  See supra notes 11–13 discussion and accompanying text. 
101  See, e.g., Case C-444/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou AE (OPAP), 
2004 E.C.R. I-10555. 
102  Id. ¶ 52.  
103  Id. ¶ 51. 
104  Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10417. 
105  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE chs. 6–8 
(5th ed. 2016).  
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this Note is focused on Section 1 conduct.106 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: 
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person 
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.107 
As articulated by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, there are three main 
reasons for closer scrutiny of concerted joint-venture conduct.108 First, the more 
stringent scrutiny is based in large part on the textual structure of the Sherman 
Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Act precedes Section 2.109 It almost certainly bears 
some historical significance as the Sherman Act was created in large part to 
“prevent[] restraints to free competition in business and commercial transactions 
which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to 
the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had 
come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.”110 
Second, most joint-venture agreements involve concerted actors who are 
seeking to privately benefit.111 Joint ventures result in gains to a company’s overall 
efficiency and power in its specific product market.112 From an economic 
perspective, the joint venture then acts as a distinct monopoly, where the venture 
can raise prices above the optimal value or reduce output to harm consumers.113 
 
 
106  See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
107  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
108  HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, at 258. 
109  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. 
110  Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).  
111  HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, at 258. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 24. 
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Figure 1114 
 
In Figure 1—showing monopolistic pricing effects—normal market 
competitive price, such as that with sports data suppliers prior to the joint 
venture, would be at P, which is the market equilibrium price at the intersection 
of marginal cost (MC) and amount of revenue sold (AR). After the teams merge 
to create a joint venture, the market price shifts to P1, where price is higher 
than that of the competitive market equilibrium.115 
The third reason for heightened judicial scrutiny is that, through the joint 
venture’s shift of output from Q to Q1, trade is artificially restrained in direct 
violation of the Sherman Act.116 This restraint results summarily in lower 
market output, both in quality and quantity.117 The end goal of a permissible 
joint venture should be to improve the product and experience for the 
consumer.118 If a joint venture harms consumers and competition in the specific 
market, there is summarily no reason to allow for its existence.119 
Historically, joint venture antitrust analyses have centered around two 
main issues: (a) whether a joint venture between wholly distinct entities exists, 
or whether the agreement is simply a vertical restraint; and (b) if the agreement 




114  Monopoly, ECON. ONLINE, https://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Monopoly.html (last 
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ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 837 (2014) (discussing Judge Bork’s reimagining of the principles of antitrust not to 
prohibit competition but only to prohibit conduct that in turn harms “consumer welfare”). 
119  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 105, at 259. 
120  See Matthew Bester, Joint Ventures and the Single Entity Doctrine After American Needle, Inc. v. National 
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A. Distinct Entities 
 
Since firms cannot legally compete with themselves,121 a court must first 
determine the level of integration of venture firms.122 Determining what 
constitutes a permissible level of integration has puzzled judges for decades, but 
it is a crucial step to the ultimate goal of concluding whether further litigation is 
needed.123 
Following Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., parents and 
subsidiary firms are not considered legally separate competitors.124 The 
reasoning behind this notion is important to this analysis—firms that function 
in a parent-subsidiary format lack competitive motives but share an overarching 
common goal.125 A parent firm may also show a lack of competition between it 
and a subsidiary firm when it acts in a way not conducive to the firm’s best 
interest, showing an underlying anticompetitive motive.126 
The nuances of joint venture agreements are best illustrated by two 
contrasting cases decided by the Supreme Court. First, in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 
the defendants successfully argued that their venture was fully integrated.127 
Two major oil companies, Texaco and Shell, jointly formed a corporation to sell 
and market gasoline on the west coast of the United States.128 The Court 
determined that there was no issue with the joint venture; the companies not 
only integrated their facilities and operations but also still competed with each 
other.129 
In contrast to Dagher, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the 
defendants, medical societies, were found to be liable for price fixing fees charged 
to patients.130 A variety of factors, including the lack of operational integration, 
the lack of new products, and the lack of profit sharing differentiated the 
societies’ operations from permissible joint ventures.131 
In the sports context, most joint ventures fall under the category of partial 
integration. If categorized as partially integrated, courts will still consider the 
 
121  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
122  Bester, supra note 120, at 10. 
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costs. E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (restating the principle that “proceeding to 
antitrust discovery can be expensive”). 
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125  While this forecloses most competitive motives, some intrabrand competition may exist—for example, 
between various brands of General Motors vehicles.  
126  See Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2012). 
127  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). 
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same analysis—the level of integration of the firms.132 This categorization was 
squarely addressed in the seminal sports case of American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League, where the issue was the NFL’s joint licensing of 
intellectual property.133 Prior to 2000, the jointly formed National Football 
League Properties (NFLP) coordinated the development and licensing of team 
merchandise.134 In December 2000, the NFLP decided to grant an exclusive 
license to Reebok as the sole NFL apparel manufacturer, rescinding licenses 
with other manufacturers, including American Needle.135 
The Court concluded that regardless of the formal name to which the joint 
venture is given, concerted action under Section 1 revolves around how the 
entities act in concert.136 Justice Stevens, in a unanimous decision of the Court, 
likened the issue to that from Copperweld Corp., stating that the inquiry turns 
to simply whether the venture is created through separate decision makers with 
the result depriving the marketplace of previously independent decision 
makers.137 In American Needle, Inc., the Court determined that NFL teams are 
independently owned and operated entities that compete regularly on things 
such as ticket sales, sponsorships, and broadcast revenue.138 Thus, while some 
concerted action is required to produce NFL football, that does not mean the 
teams have a blanket immunity to all Section 1 liability.139 After American 
Needle, Inc., courts should look to whether each team is actively pursuing unique 
economic interests that are an “instrumentality of the teams.” 140 If so, separate-
entity status exists, and courts move on to the next step of the analysis. 
 
B. Restraint of Competition 
 
Antitrust litigation is an extraordinarily time-consuming and expensive 
venture for all parties involved.141 In a perfect world, the Department of Justice, the 
Federal Trade Commission, and private plaintiffs would have unlimited resources 
to examine every agreement’s most minute inner workings to determine its 
credibility. Unfortunately, that is not our current reality.142 Given the extreme 
complexity and uncertainty involved in determining liability on a case-by-case 
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basis, courts have developed a series of shortcuts in analyzing restraints of trade 
that are inherently anticompetitive, namely the per se analysis.143 The Supreme 
Court’s adoption of the per se analysis truncates the necessary inquiries, permitting 
the court to conclude illegal conduct without further inquiry.144 
When anticompetitive consequences of a restraint are clear but viable 
procompetitive justifications that could merit scrutiny exist, courts occasionally 
employ a quick-look analysis.145 This application is appropriate primarily when 
similar conducts have been found to be violation of Section 1.146 Courts have 
historically done a balancing test, analyzing whether, in the constrained market, 
the joint venture’s procompetitive justifications outweigh the procompetitive effects 
by looking at whether the restraints are considered “ancillary.”147  
Courts will commonly examine a restraint in relation to the purpose of the 
joint venture.148 Restraints are categorized as either affecting competition inside 
the venture or outside it.149 Restraints that are inside the venture are those that 
have an underlying purpose related to the venture’s primary function.150 
Historically, this function was defined as whether the venture’s purpose comes from 
decisions of a single, unitary focal point.151 Recently, the definition of a restraint 
has become more controversial. The center of much of this debate surrounds Justice 
Thomas’s characterization in Dagher of internal restraints as those that affect “core 
activity.”152 Many commentators and judges have noted that this definition can be 
overbroad, especially in relation to sports leagues.153 
Conversely, restraints can occur outside of the venture, such as those in 
American Needle. In effectuating the need for a specialized inquiry for sports teams, 
the Court reasoned that teams need to cooperate, and the “‘special characteristics of 
this industry may provide a justification’ for many kinds of agreements.”154 
Invoking the Court’s prior reasoning in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma, Justice Stevens noted that some aspects of joint agreements are 
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necessary to make “the entire league successful and profitable,” including that of 
scheduling, sharing necessary rules to provide uniform playing standards, etc.155 
Since Board of Regents, courts have delineated three interrelated tests for 
determining whether a restraint is ancillary or not.156 The first test is whether the 
restraint has the potential to accomplish “legitimate objectives.”157 The second is 
whether the restraint is itself reasonable.158 Third is whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary for an “efficiency-enhancing purpose[].”159 
Regarding the second test of reasonableness, most agreements are 
themselves inherently reasonable—that is precisely why we have the quick-look 
analysis.160 Agreements always have the potential to accomplish legally 
cognizable objectives, but the inquiry should go further and look to the motives 
found below the surface.161 The reasonably necessary test is the most workable; 
it is stringent enough to look at an underlying purpose by asking whether the 
market really needs this restraint. The question then becomes: How does this all 
apply to the agreements made by the NBA and MLB? 
The short answer is that it depends. The Supreme Court has construed 
Section 1 to apply to all agreements of separately owned and operated entities, 
such as MLB and NBA teams.162 The entity structures in the MLB and NBA are 
most analogous to those present in American Needle. MLB and NBA teams are 
separate legal entities that engage in regular competition, just like NFL teams 
from American Needle.163 Especially regarding national sponsorships, MLB and 
NBA teams are in direct competition with each other and different leagues. For 
example, the New York Mets signed a twenty-year $400 million stadium naming 
rights sponsorship to Citigroup in 2007.164 In response, the NBA’s Brooklyn Nets 
signed a similar agreement with fellow major bank, Barclays PLC, for $20 
million per year.165 Unlike most other revenue-sharing agreements, individual 
clubs keep all profit they gain from sponsorship contracts, so there is intense 
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competition to court those corporations that will pay the most.166 As such, 
individual MLB and NBA clubs lack the “complete unity of interest” to be 
considered a single entity, and are subject to a rigorous Section 1 joint venture 
analysis.167 
The next part of the inquiry rests in the relationship of the competitive 
restraint to the objective of the perceived joint venture.168 The restraints at issue 
in American Needle, as well as the corollary restraints at issue in a potential 
challenge to the MLB and NBA sports data agreements, are subject to an 
analysis as “outside venture restraints.”169 This analysis was a crucial part of 
the Court’s opinion in American Needle, and the main reason the NFL’s 
argument fell apart.170 There, the NFL argued that the competitive nature of 
sports leagues is such that concerted action is necessary to keep the league 
functioning properly.171 The Court found this argument unpersuasive.172 Justice 
Stevens noted that “for many such ventures, the participation of others is 
necessary. But that does not mean that necessity of cooperation [in certain 
respects] transforms concerted action into independent action. . . .”173 But in true 
Supreme Court fashion, the Court’s most widely cited view on this topic occurs in 
a footnote.174 In footnote seven, the Court further stated that just because 
“leaguewide agreements are necessary to produce football, it does not follow that 
concerted activity in marketing intellectual property is necessary to produce 
football.” The Court feared that should this conduct be immunized, “[m]embers 
of any cartel could insist that their cooperation is necessary to produce the 
‘cartel product’ and compete with other products.”175 
Just as the Court did not go so far as to immunize NFL teams from all 
Section 1 liability because of a small need to collude to produce their product, that 
same principle would follow for NBA and MLB teams. Professional sports require 
some interaction between two independent firms to create a marketable product.176 
One can conceive of the necessary aspects of professional baseball and basketball 
that merit collusion and standardization—scheduling, rules adoption, and even 
uniform ownership requirements ensure teams are, at the very least, in qualified 
hands.177  
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In a similar vein, even though NBA and MLB teams happen to operate 
jointly in some regards, they are not wholly immune to Section 1 liability for their 
conduct surrounding the sale of sports data.178 Here, just as with the high degree of 
competition for team intellectual property rights in American Needle, there is a 
distinct future need of a robust market for a team’s advanced data.179 The more 
technology progresses, the more sportsbooks will have the ability and desire to 
create new and innovative wagers for their consumers.180 Likewise, the more 
nuanced and complex wagers that sportsbooks can offer, the higher the demand will 
be for advanced data metrics to ensure accurate betting lines for sportsbooks to 
optimize their profits.181 This market is unrelated to the necessary cooperation to 
run the MLB and NBA, and must be similarly treated as wholly independent 




The effect of permitting unregulated joint ventures extends far beyond sports. 
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, antitrust laws have advanced the noble 
mission of representing the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”183 In the Sherman 
Act’s early days, Presidents Roosevelt and Taft were steadfast in breaking up large 
conglomerate corporations, including the railways184 and the infamous Standard 
Oil.185 Justice Douglas called monopoly a “curse of bigness” and reasoned that 
antitrust law is “founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private 
hands of power so great that only a government of the people should have it.”186 
Justice Douglas’s concerns still persist. The United States consistently has 
one of the highest rates of income inequality in the industrialized world, with the 
richest .1% of Americans taking in as much wealth as the bottom 90%.187 This 
wealth gap more than doubled between 1989 and 2016—the same time period as 
the growth of economic theories popularized by conservatives such as Ronald 
Reagan and Robert Bork.188 Ever since, large corporations have begun to overtake 
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and control the American markets, concentrating power into the hands of the 
privileged and wealthy.189 
Allowing large joint ventures, such as those undertaken by the MLB and 
NBA, would further exacerbate the issues plaguing America’s lower and middle 
classes. Large-scale conglomeration of market power negatively manifests in many 
ways including the widespread losses of jobs to overseas labor markets and the 
changes in corporate governance policies that allow executives to take larger pieces 
of the pie while leaving their workforce struggling.190 
Effective competition policy, like that enacted during the Obama 
Administration,191 can help to alleviate some of these concerns. For antitrust 
enforcement mechanisms to take on these issues, they need to use the tools already 
at their disposal. This principle—helping the average American—is well enshrined 
into our antitrust laws as the “Consumer Welfare” standard.192 A continued 
adherence to this standard will not require any changes from the courts, but could 
increase wealth redistribution into smaller, locally owned businesses. Additionally, 
in regulating the conglomeration of market power, enforcers must be wary of 
efficiency-related excuses by company executives. While good for profits, this end 
goal can leave workers and their families with suppressed wages and can contribute 




From bat sensors that measure hitting velocity to pitching sleeves that 
measure arm fatigue, both the MLB and NBA have “established a framework that 
could unlock a deep trove of player performance data” expanding upon key priorities 
of player improvement and injury prevention.194 But just as quickly as teams try to 
improve their product by adopting new and emerging technology, so too do 
sportsbooks and sports data suppliers. As the market to offer the best and latest 
statistical information to suppliers grows in the near future, it will be interesting to 
see how centralized data policies such as the ones adopted by the MLB and the NBA 
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survive antitrust scrutiny.  
While it is still too soon to predict the outcome of any such litigation that may 
result, these agreements should, at the very least, be subject to the same rigorous 
analysis as the NFL’s in American Needle. For the sake of consistency, the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should provide guidance 
on the exact concerted action permissible for professional sports teams. If left 
unresolved, teams can and will conceivably use the Department and Commission’s 
tacit approval to further restrict competition in markets wholly unrelated to those 
necessary to produce their sport’s entertainment product. 
